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PROCEEDING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Ascertaining that all offensive weapons are out of Cuba

QUESTION: How can we be certain that all the offensive weapons are out of Cuba and not hidden in caves and warehouses?

ANSWER: There is no positive way of assuring that all of Russia's offensive weapons are indeed out of Cuba unless we have an adequate system of on-site inspection. We have, and are, insisting upon such verification. In the absence of such verification, we will continue our air surveillance. Incidentally, while such surveillance cannot, of course, detect hidden missiles, it can detect any movement of those missiles necessary for their use; you cannot fire a missile from a cave.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED BY

DATE 5/19/88

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

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